The Brexit Phony War is coming to an end.
Apparently the government is preparing to trigger Article 50 next week. Having trounced the House of Lords, the EU negotiatiors will be a cakewalk.
- Commons: Give us the precious!
- Lords: It is too much power. You must consent to some minor restrictions.
- Commons: Give us the precious!
- Lords: Okay.
Why do the Lords even bother to go on existing?
One of the more bizarre claims made by the government was to explain its opposition to the House of Lords amendment that mandates a final vote in Parliament on the Brexit deal in two years.
Downing Street has warned Lords that an attempt to give Parliament the final say over Brexit will “incentivise” the EU to give Britain a bad deal.
The Prime Minister’s spokesman argued that guaranteeing Parliament the power to reject Theresa May’s deal would “give strength” to EU negotiators during talks.
What is bizarre is that the usual argument is exactly the opposite: The negotiators are strengthened by being able to argue that their hands are tied by needing to convince skeptical legislators back home. Don’t bother offering us a crappy deal, because even if you dazzle us, it will never get through Parliament.
I understand the difference here — the EU doesn’t actually have much motivation to make any deal at all, and would be happy to have it rejected — but that just underlines how fatally weak the British position is. Supposing the EU negotiators would offer a deal that they are sure Parliament would reject. There are two possibilities:
1) The government would reject it too. In that case, it would never go to Parliament anyway, so Parliament’s right to a final vote is moot.
2) The government would accept it. In that case, what would motivate them to offer a better deal?
Am I missing something?
Common Infirmities 